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Agar, N., 2010. Humanity’s End. Why We Should Reject
Radical Enhancement. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 224
pages. ISBN: 978-0262014625. Price: U$S 32
In Humanity’s End, Nicholas Agar challenges proponents
of radical enhancement. He argues that some enhancements
can be a threat to humanity and therefore should be
rejected. For him, radical enhancement could kill us, distort
some of our values, and bring a tyranny of posthumans
over humans.
In the first two chapters, he defines radical enhancement
and introduces the notion of ‘‘species-relativism.’’ Radical
enhancements are interventions such as uploading and
SENS (strategies for engineered negligible senescence)
which can turn us into posthumans. Agar argues that
humans should not become posthumans because ‘‘certain
experiences and ways of existing properly valued by
[humans] may lack value for the [posthumans]’’ (13).
Looking at reproduction, he offers a species-relativist
argument that posthumans will likely not be able to
reproduce with Homo sapiens. He sees this as a threat to
our shared humanity. He argues that ‘‘reproductive barriers
set the boundaries for an important collection of values,
and that we should recognize radical enhancement as
infringing on these values’’ (21). Therefore, shared human
values put limits on enhancement.
From chapter three to eight, he outlines and replies to
‘‘four would-be radical enhancers’’ (Ray Kurzweil, Aubrey
de Grey, Nick Bostrom, and James Hughes). Kurzweil
envisages uploading our mind from brain to machine. Agar
thinks that uploading is irrational as one will not be able to
know whether or not it works. Moreover, if it does not
work, it might kill us. Aubrey de Grey seeks to stop aging
and increase our life-span. In order to achieve this at a
cellular level, de Grey proposes the removal of the telo-
merase gene from every bodily cell. He is aware of the
many difficulties that arise from this, but has some hypo-
thetical solutions for each. Not answering whether or not
this is feasible, Agar reframes the discussion and asks if it
is beneficial to live forever. For him, it is problematic,
because a posthuman lifestyle might not be worth it after
all. Bostrom claims that rejecting radical enhancement is
immoral, irrational, and maybe both. For him, posthumans
will enjoy and share similar values that the ones held by
opponents of enhancement. Agar disagrees with this claim
and outlines that Bostrom’s values would rather favour the
rejection of radical enhancement. Hughes suggests a
‘‘democratic transhumanism’’ that would ensure a peaceful
co-habitation between apes, humans and posthumans,
based on the idea that they are all persons. Agar’s reply is
that ‘‘once posthumans come into existence, they may view
humans as morally required to defer to them, to permit our
interests to be sacrificed to promote theirs. Thus, the path
of radical enhancement for some humans significantly
threatens the interests of other humans’’ (152). Agar’s
remark is on target: who knows, after all, if a posthuman
society will embrace a democratic transhumanism? Some
might rather be tempted to become posthumans to exert
their power over other humans.
In the concluding chapter, Humanity’s End presents
‘‘some good news about remaining ‘merely’ human’’ (179).
Agar warns us that the problem of radical enhancement is
that of alienation from ourselves, our children, and elite
athletes.
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Overall, the book is well organized, well researched and
easy to follow. Readers will even appreciate some humorous
passages (see pages 90, 122, 153). Humanity’s End is a well
needed contribution to a debate in which pro-posthuman
arguments start to abound. Agar brings the helpful per-
spective that the future hoped for by proponents of radical
enhancement might not be so great after all. Fortunately,
Agar argues that ‘‘humanity isn’t just what we get left with
once we’ve said no to Kurzweil, de Grey, Bostrom, and
Hughes. It’s something worth celebrating’’ (179). Not all
enhancements have to be accepted. Each has to be assessed
on its own.
However, Agar’s critique may have some challenges to
answer, as some might still be willing to sacrifice their
lives to become posthumans. First, his rebuttal of upload-
ing may be unconvincing. One can imagine that, after a
long-lived and fulfilled life, someone will try to upload
herself. Acknowledging that she will die soon anyways,
why not take the risk? Even knowing she will be separated
from the rest of humanity, she might prefer to be alienated
and alive than dead. If someone else imitates her, her
alienation might be lessened. Second, while a critique of de
Grey is needed, Agar’s attempt is not entirely satisfying.
De Grey’s posthumans might not be as heavenly as he
envisages them. Nonetheless, one might still prefer this
lifestyle to the alternative (death). Moreover, as new
technologies come, new behaviors and values are created
and Homo sapiens may adapt.
In conclusion, in my view, Agar is basically right: rad-
ical enhancement could bring death, could alter some
human values, and could bring tyranny. But some might be
tempted to risk their lives, to change their values and to
access power over other humans. Therefore, we will gain in
evaluating whether we value more our humanity or our
posthumanity and whether sacrificing our lives would be
worthwhile. Humanity’s End is the right book to start this
assessment. I recommend this book as a well-needed cri-
tique of radical enhancements by a leading scholar in this
debate. Reading Agar’s earlier book Liberal Eugenics will
be a great complement for those who wish to get the whole
picture of his position in this debate.
Johann A. R. Roduit
Zurich, Switzerland
Van Lommel, P., 2010, Consciousness Beyond Life. The
Science of the Near-Death Experience. New York: Harp-
erOne. 442 pages. ISBN 978-0061777257. Price: £ 11.89
Pim van Lommel is a Dutch cardiologist who has studied
near-death experiences (NDE) for more than twenty years.
In 2001 he published in The Lancet the results of one of the
largest prospective studies that have been conducted up to
now in this field. In Consciousness Beyond Life, which is a
translation of a volume originally published in Dutch (Ein-
deloos Bewustzijn), he explains that he was impressed by the
number of his patients who, after a cardiac arrest, reported
having lived an ineffable experience, which was strikingly
similar in most cases: the awareness of being dead; a pro-
found feeling of peace and well-being; the sense of being
placed outside time and space; the perception of one’s body
from an outside position; the sense of travelling through a
‘tunnel’ towards an exceptionally brilliant and friendly light;
the perception of an unconditional love; and a very detailed
review of their whole lives. Some patients were even able to
give a precise account of the conversations that took place,
as they were still unconscious, between members of the
medical team in the intensive care unit, or between relatives
in the waiting room of the hospital. Interestingly, after such
an experience, most patients’ personalities underwent a
radical change: they lost any fear of death, began to have a
heightened sense of purpose in their lives, and became more
compassionate and caring with others.
Van Lommel explains that he was specially intrigued by
this phenomenon because, according to dominant medical
concepts, it is absolutely impossible to experience any kind
of consciousness when the circulation and breathing have
ceased, the brain does not work any more, and the patient is
clinically dead. In his book, he examines in detail the
various physiological and psychological theories about the
origin of NDE that have been proposed. Some think, for
instance, that the experience is caused by physiological
changes in the brain such as brain cells dying as a result of
cerebral anoxia, or caused by release of endorphins. Others
claim that NDE could be the result of a sort of hallucina-
tion caused by some drugs. Van Lommel discards these
theories as they are unable to fully explain all the features
that characterize this phenomenon. In his view, we must
acknowledge that we are dealing here with something that
seriously challenges the current (too narrow and mecha-
nistic) view that sees consciousness as a mere product of
brain function. His hypothesis is that, in reality, things are
the other way round: the brain does not produce con-
sciousness but rather facilitates it; the brain operates as an
‘‘interface’’ or ‘‘relay station’’ of our consciousness. He
compares metaphorically the brain to a television’s recei-
ver picking up information from an electromagnetic field.
According to van Lommel, ‘‘whereas our waking con-
sciousness has a biological basis because our body func-
tions as an interface, there is no biological basis for our
endless and nonlocal consciousness, which has its roots in
nonlocal space. Waking consciousness is experienced via
the body, but endless consciousness does not reside in our
brain’’ (p. 318).
Clearly, Van Lommel’s hypothesis puts into question
the dominant understanding of the brain-consciousness
relationship. If he is right in his analysis, we should begin
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to consider ourselves as something more than merely
physical bodies, much more than the expression of a par-
ticular DNA or of a complex web of neuronal interaction,
because the very core of our personhood has a non-mate-
rial nature. Obviously, this conclusion has tremendous
existential implications that go far beyond the limits of a
merely academic debate.
Whatever conclusions we might draw from this phe-
nomenon, it seems well that it deserves to be seriously
analyzed, and no more regarded as a taboo subject. Several
empirical studies on NDE have been conducted in recent
years showing the striking consistency of near death
experience accounts across countries and cultures (see, for
instance, the studies by Bruce Greyson in the US and by
Sam Parnia in the UK). Van Lommel’s book is an impor-
tant step in this direction and can perhaps contribute to a
better explanation of the brain-consciousness relationship,
and, maybe, of what it ultimately means to be a ‘‘self’’.
Roberto Andorno
Zurich, Switzerland
Selgelid, M., Pogge T., 2010, Health Rights. Farnham:
Ashgate. 429 pages. ISBN 978-0754627944. Price: £ 130
Michael Selgelid and Thomas Pogge provide us with an
extensive collection of essays on Health Rights. Their
contribution meets a persistent demand, since discussions
about the normative status of health tend to be impeded by
reoccurring confusion about what the idea of health related
rights is about. The most influential source mentioning a
right to health is the preamble of the constitution of the
WHO. However, the statement of a right to health
encounters practical difficulties and has been subject to a
variety of reinterpretations. Thus, addressing the concept of
health rights remains philosophically, ethically and politi-
cally important. The answer to the question of whether
health rights are to be understood in terms of the right to a
certain condition, the right to certain services, or the right
to social equality with regard to health, has wide reaching
normative consequences.
Selgelid’s and Pogge’s volume comprises 25 previously
published essays on different issues related to health rights,
accompanied by a short introduction and a general over-
view of the essays. All of the texts are reprinted in the
layout and pagination of their original publication in
journals and collections. Except for the essays that intro-
duce into the basic concept of health rights, most of the
texts are not older than ten years. The collection is divided
into 5 parts, covering different levels of analysis from the
conceptual basis of health-related rights to the discussion
of urging practical issues related to health rights.
The first part deals with the theoretical foundations of
what is mostly referred to as a right to health. The essays in
this part can be considered as classics. The articles by
Fried, Beauchamp and Faden, Daniels, Buchanan, Brock,
O’Neill, and Hessler give a comprehensive overview of
what can be understood by ‘‘health related rights’’ as
opposed to a ‘‘right to health’’, and what philosophical
difficulties are linked to these concepts. The second part
contains two essays that analyze the link between health
and human rights, and articulate different conceptions of
their interdependence. The third part deals with the role of
health rights in global bioethics and public health ethics.
Marks introduces to the legal and normative notion of the
human right to health. Mann shows that those branches of
bioethics that focus on public health can profit from the
application of a human rights framework. Five more essays
in this section deal with the demands that pressing global
inequalities in health pose. The last two parts are dedicated
to urging health issues. Part four continues the discussion
on global health by focusing on intellectual property rights
in pharmaceuticals. The essays explain the practical reali-
ties of international patents on drugs and their negative
impact on global public health. Finally, part five of the
collection deals with a variety of concrete applications of
health rights: HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and gender dis-
crimination. In the final essay, Kopeman takes a conclud-
ing view on the status of human rights claims in terms of
universal norms and defends it against conventialist and
relativist objections.
Selgelid’s and Pogge’s collection leads a well structured
path through the complex matter of the foundations of
health rights and the practical complexities that are
encountered in their realization. Health Rights offers a
useful and balanced insight into a debate that is philo-
sophically and politically challenging, and ethically
indispensable.
Simon Derpmann
Mu¨nster, Germany
Mol A., Moser, I., Pols, J. (eds.), 2010, Care in Practice.
On Tinkering in Clinics, Homes and Farms. Bielefeld:
Transcript. 326 pages. ISBN 978-3837614473. Price: €
35,80
Although care is central to daily life, it has not been studied
in the academic world for so long. Only recently this is
changing, and the editors of this book intend to stimulate and
strengthen this process. They also alert us that to understand
care and care practices we have to look beyond rules and
regulations, and search for the heart of care by describing
how care is realized in the practices that have to do with
care. The editors composed articles on various care practices
within the scope of farming, health care and care for people
who are old or who cope with disabilities. They selected
three themes that could be seen as a sort of framework of the
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subjects discussed in the contributions. The first is referred
to as ‘public and private’. Given words to care in practices
means making it public, but at the same time we need to
realize that the use of words also has its limits. It helps to
develop insights and could strengthen good care, but always
is a process of tinkering. The second theme that is inter-
twined in the articles is ‘the good, the bad and the ambiv-
alent’. Giving detailed descriptions of the practices
illuminates which qualities and values are involved and is
considered as a first step to improve care practices. It opens
questions related to the quality of care, becoming aware of
the complexities and ambivalences that are interwoven in
practices. Detecting ambivalences makes care an ongoing
negotiation how to balance different (contradicting) values.
Again, a matter of tinkering. The third theme refers to the
intertwinement of technology and care; ‘technology and
humanness’. These areas no longer can be seen separately;
they influence and construct each other constantly.
The contributions in this book all start with an ethno-
graphical way of describing practices. They illustrate
clearly how care relationships could change during spe-
cific interventions and care processes. For example the
article by Brit Ross Winthereik and Henriette Langstrup is
a good example of this. They conducted research on the
implementation of a web-based record for maternity care
aiming to stimulate the pregnant women to become more
‘active patients’. But in the end this project resulted in
that the pregnant women would stimulate the health care
professionals to take their responsibilities in using the
electronic records. It reconfigured the relations between
the ‘patients’ and the health care professionals in a sur-
prising way. Another contribution, by Myriam Winance,
illustrates the tinkering search in testing out wheelchairs
for persons. The stories illustrate that care is shared work;
moving beyond theories of care ethics and disability
studies. Care also includes modulating relationships to
tinker into a good balance between all persons that are
involved.
This book can be considered as an important contribu-
tion in the research of care in practice. It moves beyond
theories of care by choosing practices as starting point to
evaluate and improve theoretical insights. This approach is
able to present new and surprising insights and for that it is
valuable for every qualitative researcher in care practices.
Elleke Landeweer
Amsterdam, The Nethterlands
Wild, V., 2010, Arzneimittelforschung an schwangeren
Frauen. Dilemma, Kontroversen und ethische Diskussion.
Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag. 256 pages. ISBN
978-3-593390536. Price: € 32,90
In her book on medical research on pregnant women, Ve-
rina Wild sheds light on the therapeutic dilemma pregnant
women face: to protect them and their offspring they are
almost categorically excluded from any clinical trial. Thus,
due to lack of data, they are barred from medical progress
and do not have access to the best available therapies. Wild
first presents a systematic and historical overview of
medical research and therapy for pregnant women with a
special focus on Switzerland and Germany (33–83). The
1960s thalidomide-related events are pivotal to the para-
digm change. Research with pregnant women has since
been regarded as unethical. This dogma has remained
unchallenged for almost half a century. Only recently
controversy on the inclusion of pregnant women in clinical
trials has flared up again. Wild shows on the basis of lit-
erature reviews and expert interviews with gynaecologists
that German-speaking countries are lagging far behind in
this debate. Astonishingly, the ethical ‘taboo’ is not gen-
erally called into question while considerations of com-
mercial and liability risks prevail in actual decision-
making.
In the second part of her book (85–106) Wild examines
several legislative instruments and guidelines on medical
research with pregnant women. The most liberal regimes
are proposed by the Council for International Organiza-
tions of Medical Sciences guidelines (CIOMS 2002) and
2005 US federal legislation. Wild includes interpretations
of the 2009 draft of the Swiss federal law on research with
human subjects (Humanforschungsgesetz) and highlights
the patent lacunae in German regulation. In addition, in the
third part of her book (107–164), she offers an example of
how empirical research and theoretical reasoning can
meaningfully complement each other in biomedical ethics.
Thirty qualitative interviews with pregnant women illus-
trate the problems they encounter when faced with therapy-
related decision-making.
In the last and most original part of her book (165–207),
Wild proposes a multi-tier taxonomy for the inclusion of
pregnant women in medical research. She distinguishes
between unproblematic and problematic study types
according to their risk profiles and the expected benefit for
the women and/or fetuses involved as well as the group of
pregnant women (173–175, 204–206). Wild develops the
notion of ‘‘double unity’’ (190) to capture the unique
character of the feto-maternal relationship and questions
the alleged per se vulnerability of pregnant women. While
the predominant concept of vulnerability builds on
impaired decision-making capacities or increased exploi-
tation risks, Wild argues in favour of a concept of ‘‘situa-
tive vulnerability’’ (198) and contends (188–193) that if the
prevailing interpretation of vulnerability cannot be upheld,
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autonomous decision-making by pregnant women need not
be challenged (neither for herself nor for her fetus). Hence,
there is no room for paternalistic protectionism even with
regard to minimal risk studies that lack the prospect of
direct benefit.
A synopsis of her main theses and an English-language
summary round off Wild’s book (209–214) and make it
easily accessible for both hasty and non-German speaking
readers. Ideally, the book will stimulate public discussion
so that policy-makers realise that the dogma to exclude
pregnant women from all kinds of clinical trials is ethically
unjustified and can no longer be upheld in an undifferen-
tiated way.
Katja Stoppenbrink
Luxembourg
Benatar, S. and Brock, G. (eds.), 2011, Global Health and
Global Health Ethics. New York: Cambridge University
Press. 342 pages. ISBN 978-0521146677. Price: € 45.99
One of the most pressing and serious problems of our
increasingly globalized world is the poor state of global
health. It concerns not only biomedical or general ethics,
but also political philosophy, since it presupposes basic
issues of moral and political responsibility. In order to
justify claims of responsibility and, at the same time, to
identify alternative courses of action to deal with this
problem, a range of scientific disciplines have to work
together. If we want to know how issues of social justice
and political economy do have impact on the distribution of
health, it is evident that not only medicine and philosophy
have to make their contribution, but that also the input of
social sciences and economics is needed.
In this volume, the reader will find thirty papers
(introduction included) covering the various disciplines
and addressing many different topics which are related to
the questions of why global health is actually in such a poor
state, and how we might be able to improve this situation.
Among the topics covered in this volume are infectious
diseases, climate change, biotechnology, food security and
the structures of trade and foreign aid. Behind this variety
of topics there are two themes uniting the contributions to
this volume: Firstly it is asked in which way we exacerbate
poor global health; and secondly it is discussed what
should be done to remedy the factors identified. Further-
more, and this is no surprising, another common factor is
the conviction of all contributors that we (mainly in the
western world) are morally and politically responsible for
this sad situation and therefore are also in charge to con-
tribute overcoming the poor state of global health.
It is not the main aim of this volume to develop ethical
arguments to establish that we are morally in charge
(although some papers deliver arguments for this, too).
Readers who are generally sceptic about this will not be
persuaded. The strength of this volume which refers to
readers from many different disciplines is that it deepens
our understanding of the challenges the problem of global
health poses on us, and that it allows formulating plausible
tasks and measures to improve the situation. Thus Global
Health and Global Health Ethics can and should be taken
as an overview and appeal for interdisciplinary efforts and
political engagement. For non-philosophers the papers
analysing e. g. the concepts of justice or responsibility will
be of help as will be the empirical information for phi-
losophers. Taken together this volume is a fine demon-
stration how an interdisciplinary perspective can help us to
understand better such a complex and burdening situation.
As we all know this is an important step in overcoming the
feeling of being simply helpless. Therefore this book can
be regarded as a key resource for bioethicists, public health
practitioners and philosophers.
Michael Quante
Mu¨nster, Germany
Knell, S., Weber, M.: 2009, Menschliches Leben. Berlin,
New York: Walter de Gruyter. 221 pages. ISBN: 978-3-
110219838. Price: € 24.95
In this book, Sebastian Knell and Marcel Weber explore
the concept of human life with respect to its temporal
boundaries and with a particular emphasis on the notion of
life span extension. The book is divided into three chapters.
In the first chapter (11ff), the authors explore the meta-
physical questions about the unity and identity of a human
life over time and the conditions of human persistence.
They propose a model according to which biological
individuals are in first approximation clonal groups of cells.
These assemblies are functionally integrated and consist of
specialized cells, which fulfil different roles towards the
propagation of the whole assembly (45ff, 51). One
important feature in such cell assemblies is functional
integration. However, functional integration is a gradual
property, it is for instance higher in a three-month embryo
than in an embryo consisting of 1–4 cells. There is thus no
specific criterion to determine when a living organism
begins to live. They conclude that there is no clearly
definable biological borderline between life and death
(47ff).
In the second chapter (55ff), the authors analyse scien-
tific explanations for ageing. They distinguish between
proximate explanations, which describe the ageing process
at molecular level, and ultimate explanations, which refer
to evolutionary mechanism to explain why ageing occurs.
The authors are particularly interested in the question of
whether extension of human life span is possible. This is of
course to a large extent an empirical question, and the
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authors describe several biological observations that sup-
port the idea that life span extension might be achievable.
In the third and longest chapter (pp 109ff), the authors
discuss whether it would be desirable for individual people
to have extended life spans (i.e. around 140 or 150 years).
They point out that to answer this question, one needs to
consider various points of view: the interests of individuals,
the interests of society, and the values and norms that are
not dependent on interests (117f). They focus on the per-
spective of the individual whose life would be extended.
Again, they emphasise that this is not a purely philosoph-
ical question, and they include empirical considerations in
their analysis. Importantly, they distinguish between two
dimensions of human welfare or quality of life (121ff): (1)
Inner-life welfare is based on certain contents of human
lives that are intrinsically good for these persons. The
authors discuss three different aspects of inner-life welfare
(130ff): fulfilment of preferences, hedonistic aspects,
emotional relationships. (2) ‘‘Life-holistic welfare’’ stands
for the positive quality of life as a diachronic whole. We
refer to this type of welfare when we say of a person that he
or she has ‘‘a good life’’. The authors consider four dif-
ferent criteria in order to identify a ‘‘good life’’ (151ff):
fulfilment, success, narrative completeness and happiness.
In order to determine whether it would be desirable for
people to have an extended life span, the authors investi-
gate whether an improvement considering the two types of
welfare can be expected. They explain that due to unpre-
dictable events and influences during a human life, we
cannot predict an actual increase of welfare. However, life
span extension would also be in the interest of individual
persons if there were a good chance for an increase of
welfare (126f, 142f). The authors conclude that there is a
good chance that life span extension would lead to
improvement of all the aspects of inner-life welfare. With
respect to the various criteria of life-holistic welfare, their
conclusion is less uniform. The chance for a fulfilled life
could, for instance, be improved by an increased life span,
whereas this is not the case for a happy life.
Readers may not always agree with the authors’
assumptions and conclusions. One may for instance won-
der whether it makes sense to consider the personal inter-
ests of individuals completely detached from potential
consequences for society. Moreover, one could question
whether it is justified to ignore potential negative conse-
quences that an extended life span may have on the two
dimensions of personal welfare. However, the fact that
such questions can be formulated so specifically indicates
that the authors have succeeded in one of their major aims:
that of having provided a conceptual framework for the
discussion of this complex issue.
Anna Deplazes-Zemp
Zurich, Switzerland
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